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The Human Rights Courts and
other mechanisms to combat
impunity in Indonesia
Fergus Kerrigan & Paul Dalton,
Danish Institute for Human Rights
Article 1 (3) of the revised Constitution of Indonesia affirmsthat Indonesia is a state ruled by law. Article 4 (1) statesthat the President of the Republic holds the power of
government “in accordance with the Constitution”—thus binding
the executive power in general to the law and constitution.
Similarly, the presidential oath in article 9 binds the president
to respect the constitution and “to conscientiously implement
all statutes and regulations”.
Thus, all agents of the state who exercise public powers under
the ultimate authority of the president, do so only in accordance
with the law and constitution. Use of state power that is not for a
legal purpose or carried out according to legal rules is illegal and
potentially criminal.
The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by article 24
of the constitution. A catalogue of human rights, including the
rights to legal protection and equality before the law (article 28D),
is guaranteed in chapters X and XA. The state and government’s
duty to protect and fulfil these rights is laid down in article 28I(4).
Among the most difficult challenges faced by any legal system
is that of ensuring that officials of the state whose job it is to
enforce the law are themselves subject to punishment for
breaking it. This can be a difficult balance. Police must be allowed
to effectively protect the community against crime, and must be
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allowed to act based on their best judgment in difficult and
dangerous situations. At the same time, the powers given to law
enforcers are subject to law and allowed only for particular
purposes. They must never degenerate into a licence to commit
crime with impunity. A lack of control can undermine public faith
in the legal system and the legitimacy of the state itself.
According to law, there are three possible legal forums where
serious violations of human rights can be prosecuted and tried
in Indonesia. These are:
(i) Courts of General Jurisdiction, applying the Indonesian Penal
Code, if the offences are tried as ordinary crimes;
(ii) Human Rights Courts established under Law 26/2000, if
the offences are classified as crimes against humanity or
genocide as defined for the purposes of that law; and,
(iii) Military courts, applying the Penal Code and the Military
Penal Code, if the offences are assessed as having been committed
by a member of the armed forces on duty.
Courts of General Jurisdiction
As a general rule, military personnel cannot be tried in Courts
of General Jurisdiction. This is by virtue of article 9(a) of Law
31/1997, which provides that the Military Court has the
jurisdiction to “prosecute any crime committed by a person when
(the person) committing the said crime is a soldier”. Article 2 of
the Military Penal Code states further that “unless there are
exceptions determined by law, the Penal Code shall apply for any
crimes which are not included in this Military Penal Code that
are committed by any person subject to the Military Court”. An
exception exists as regards criminal trials in which military
personnel and civilians are indicted as co-accused. In such cases,
the trial may be heard in a Court of General Jurisdiction according
to the ‘koneksitas’ procedures described in Chapter XI of the
Criminal Procedure Code. To date these procedures have only
rarely been used in practice, although they may become more
common in the future, following the entry into force of Law
4/2004 on the Justice Authority. Article 24 of Law 4/2004 provides
that crimes jointly committed by those who are under the Civil
Court and the Military Court will be prosecuted by the Civil Court,
unless special circumstances exist, in which the head of the
Supreme Court may issue a decree that the case be prosecuted
by the Military Court.
One can broadly distinguish between two classes of crimes
committed by military personnel. Firstly, there are incidents
where a soldier, in the course of performing military duties,
abuses the force and powers given to him or her and commits a
crime. Secondly, there are crimes which, though unrelated to
military service, are committed by a person who happens to be a
member of the armed forces. Either type of offence can involve
cooperation between soldiers and non-soldiers. Law 4/2004 does
not seem to distinguish between these two categories. In the
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past, the koneksitas model has been used for both of these classes
of crime. While the failure to prosecute senior officers was
strongly criticised, the prosecution of soldiers and a civilian for
the killing of Teuku Bantaqiah and his followers in Aceh in July
1999 is a notable example of the use of koneksitas procedures
for crimes related to military actions. However, it should be pointed
out that a koneksitas court is not properly a court of general
jurisdiction. Military judges sit together with civilian ones, and
military police and prosecutors work together with their civilian
counterparts.
So in practice, almost all criminal prosecutions of military
personnel—including for alleged human rights violations—can
only be tried by military courts under existing Indonesian law.
By contrast, since the separation of the police from the armed
forces with the fall of the New Order regime, police officers can
be prosecuted and tried by the Courts of General
Jurisdiction.1 Nevertheless, there is major legal obstacle to the
prosecution of police in that the Criminal Procedure Code (Kitab
Undang-undang Hukum Acara Pidan, or KUHAP) does not permit
prosecution of any case that has not been the subject of an
investigation by the police, including cases against the police
themselves. KUHAP makes a distinction between preliminary
investigators and investigators. Article 4 defines a preliminary
investigator as "an official of the state police of the Republic of
Indonesia". Article 6(1) defines an investigator as "an official of
the state police" or "a certain official of the civil service who is
granted special authority by law". Indonesian police and
prosecutors have interpreted these provisions to mean that, in
the absence of special authority having been granted by
legislation, no one but the police can carry out a criminal
investigation and no prosecution can take place without such
an investigation having first been carried out.
The effect of this provision is that police can legally block the
investigation and prosecution of their own personnel. This
obstacle is only likely to be overcome where a case is of such
high profile that there is sufficient political pressure on the police
to conduct an internal investigation. The possibility that exists
in many other civil law countries of filing a complaint directly
with the prosecution does not exist in Indonesia. The resulting
lack of a check or balance on police power is a serious flaw that
leaves the door open for abuse, but one that could be remedied by
legislation granting special authority to a public agency
functionally and operationally independent of the police force to
investigate all cases of alleged police criminal wrongdoing.
KUHAP should be changed to allow for impartial, transparent
and accountable investigations of police. A team of experts should
examine this issue and recommend the most appropriate legal
and institutional changes necessary.
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Law 26/2000 and the Human Rights Courts
The Human Rights Courts were established due to
international pressure on Indonesia as a result of gross violations
of human rights committed in the lead up to the independence of
Timor Leste (East Timor). In 2000–2001 there was much hope
that the Human Rights Courts could be used to seriously combat
old patterns of impunity for human rights violations. Most
observers, both Indonesian and international, agree that this has
not proved to be the case.
While Law 26/2000 was generally intended as a vehicle to
incorporate some serious international crimes into Indonesian
law, and although article 7 of Law 26/2000 makes explicit
reference to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, there are some significant definitional differences between
the two, in particular with regards to “gross violations of human
rights”. Some of the important differences are as follows:
? Article 8 of Law 26/2000, dealing with genocide, does not
include the ancillary crimes of complicity, attempt, incitement
and conspiracy.
? Article 9, dealing with crimes against humanity, is to be
read together with the General Provisions of Law 26/2000, which
contain definitions of these crimes. While these definitions are
broadly similar to the definitions of crimes contained in the Rome
Statute and the “Elements of Crimes” elaborated pursuant to the
Statute, there are some unfortunate gaps. One of these is the
lack of a general inclusive provision similar to article 7(1)(k),
covering “acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical
health”.2
? Article 9 of Law 26/2000 inserts the word “direct” into the
definition of crimes against humanity; i.e., acts perpetrated as
part of a widespread and systematic direct attack. International
law knows no requirement that the attack be “direct”.
? Article 42 of Law 26/2000, on superior responsibility for
the crimes referred to in articles 8 or 9, contains (at least in the
English translation), some significant variations from the text of
the corresponding provision in article 28 of the Rome Statute.
Article 42(1) provides that a military commander or person acting
as a military commander “may” be held responsible, while article
28 uses the mandatory form “shall”. Representatives of both the
Supreme Court and the Attorney General’s Office have confirmed
that the word used in the Indonesian text is “may”. Further, in
relation to Article 42(2), the Human Rights Court has, in the
jurisprudence arising from the East Timor cases, interpreted the
word ‘subordinates’ as indicating that it is necessary to establish
that a person was exercising de jure authority over the person or
persons perpetrating the violations. At international law, it is
well established that de jure responsibility may be indicative but
is not conclusive of responsibility. The test to be satisfied is
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whether a superior, be he de jure or de facto responsible for the
actions of others below him in the chain of command, had
effective control over the persons committing the violations.3
In terms of jurisdiction, in order for an offence to be tried by
the Human Rights Courts, the crime alleged must be either
genocide or crimes against humanity (Law 26/2000, articles 4
& 7). Many serious violations of human rights, including torture,
extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance, do not in
themselves meet this requirement and so do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts.
The jurisdictional split between the Human Rights Courts,
the Courts of General Jurisdiction and Military Courts renders
impossible indictments for crimes against humanity or genocide
where there are alternative lesser charges of ordinary crimes
or violations of the laws of war. The actors at the preliminary
stages of the criminal process, the Human Rights Commission
(Komnas HAM) as the inquirer, and the Attorney General’s Office
as the investigator, must decide whether the case ought to be
prosecuted as genocide or crimes against humanity in the
Human Rights Courts, as ordinary crimes in a Court of General
Jurisdiction, or as violations of the Military Penal Code, under
the jurisdiction of the Military Court.
At international law, special conditions are required to meet
the evidentiary burden for crimes against humanity. In simple
terms, it must be shown that the act was one of the crimes
referred to in article 9 of the Rome Statute, that it occurred as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any
civilian population, and that the perpetrator was aware of such
an attack. Proving the widespread or systematic requirement is
very onerous. This requires extensive documentation of the
general situation at the time, evidence showing that the attack
was backed by state or organisational policy, and, as regards the
third element evidence, that the alleged perpetrator was either
de facto, or in certain circumstances, de jure aware of the attack.
At first sight, it would appear to be a far more attractive option
for a busy and under-resourced prosecutor to prosecute (non-
military) personnel in the Courts of General Jurisdiction, thus
avoiding the need to prove that the incident was part of a
widespread or systematic attack. Taking this course would mean
sending the inquiry report to the National Police to conduct the
investigation or, if the case involves only military personnel, to
the military police or prosecutor.
However, the Human Rights Courts offer procedural advantages
not present in the general courts, namely, an inquiry by a Komnas
HAM team and the ability to try military personnel in a civilian
court, especially one including ad hoc judges from outside the
career judiciary. In Indonesia, lack of public confidence in the
impartiality and probity of the principal justice institutions—the
police, the prosecution service and the courts—make these
procedural differences significant.
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A further advantage of Law 26/2000 is the concept of superior
responsibility, which by virtue of article 42 extends to criminal
liability for omissions. By contrast, article 55 of the Penal Code
of Indonesia (Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana, the KUHP),
dealing with forms of participation in criminal acts, does not
include liability for omissions. Among articles 127, 129 and 132
of the Military Penal Code (the KUHPM), which address command
responsibility, article 132 provides that superiors who
intentionally fail to take proper steps to repress criminal acts by
their subordinates will be subject to prosecution, but only as
accomplices. There is no reference to command responsibility
in Law 31/1997 on the Military Courts. Doubts have also been
raised about the capacity and commitment of the Military Courts
to investigate or prosecute senior military officials.
 The jurisdictional and procedural advantages of Law 26/2000
could lead to situations where Komnas HAM (or the Attorney
General’s Office) is tempted to recommend for investigation
human rights violations which, while they are very serious and
should be prosecuted, do not amount to crimes against humanity
or genocide as these terms are understood at international law.
The Attorney General, although legally free to make his own
determination on this issue, may feel considerable public
pressure to adopt the same view and proceed to an indictment
under Law 26/2000, concluding in an unsuccessful prosecution.
 The limited jurisdictional reach of the Human Rights Courts
is poorly understood among judges and prosecutors, as well as
many Indonesian human rights campaigners and the general
public. There is a widely-held perception that any cases involving
serious violations of human rights should be a matter for these
courts, rather than the ordinary courts. This also appears to be
the case among some members of Komnas HAM inquiry teams.
Komnas HAM has attempted to address this problem through
continuing education. Added to this is an understandable urge
(in the absence of other courts where perpetrators can be held
accountable) to stretch the limits of the Human Rights Courts’
jurisdiction through a liberal interpretation of the “widespread
and systematic” concept.
For as long as specialized courts dealing with human rights
violations are maintained, it should be considered to extend their
jurisdiction ratione materiae to cover both war crimes and ordinary
crimes under the KUHP. This would remove the obvious
jurisdictional and practical gap. War crimes need to be included
in their jurisdiction because of, among other reasons, the concept
of superior responsibility. Both civilians and military should be
liable for the acts of persons under their effective control. Article
28 of the Rome Statute makes no distinction between military
and civilians in this respect. This is now the position in customary
international law as a result of the Celebici decision.
Coordination between Komnas HAM and the Office of the
Prosecutor also needs to be improved. There has been a
consistent tendency on the part of the Prosecutors’ Office to blame
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the quality of the inquiry for problems encountered during
investigation or at trial. Some of the criticisms may be justified,
but a more constructive approach could lead to regular dialogue
and exchange of opinions between the two institutions.
Law 26/2000 also does not include mechanisms for addressing
a situation where the inquirer and the investigator reach
different conclusions as to whether or not to prosecute a case, or
as to which person or persons should be indicted. In their absence,
the Attorney General has the final say, under article 23(1). In
the Tanjung Priok case, Komnas HAM identified 33 people who
in its opinion should have been made accountable for their
actions, among them General Benny Moerdani (former head of
the military, now deceased) and General Try Sutrisno (who at
the time of the incident was Regional Military Commander). The
Attorney General decided to indict only 14 persons. Neither
Moerdani nor Sutrisno were among them, and no reasons were
provided for the decision. For Komnas HAM to protest the decision
or to make a formal request for reasons would be to go beyond its
mandate under the law, yet there remains a common public
perception that both Moerdani and Sutrisno were involved. The
larger question here is whether or not Komnas HAM’s very specific
role in pro justitia inquiries under Law 26 is compatible with its
general mandate as a human rights monitor. If Komnas HAM
did not have the inquiry function, it might be more openly critical
of the Attorney General’s approach to such cases, demanding
transparency and the provision of clear reasons for non-
prosecution.
Where the Attorney General refers a case for prosecution but
the prosecutors decide not to proceed, article 140 of KUHAP
requires that they specify whether the decision is based on
insufficiency of evidence, that the facts do not disclose
commission of a crime, or closure in the interest of law. However,
there is no requirement that this information be provided to
victims or complainants.
Military Courts
Since the fall of the New Order regime, several significant
administrative and legal reforms have been undertaken in
relation to the armed forces. The military no longer enjoys
separate representation in Parliament, and according to a law
passed on 30 September 2004 it will be obliged to give up its
commercial interests over a five-year period.
However, the status of the military remains controversial,
especially the continuation of the regional commands, which
enable it to maintain a presence at all levels of government.
Some fear that this will continue to allow the military to influence
government policy and its execution. Serving military personnel
can reportedly continue to occupy positions in the civilian
administration. Furthermore, the military has not yet been placed
under the control of the Ministry of Defence, which is considered
to be necessary to ensure that policy development and budgetary
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matters are determined by the government of the day. More
recently, Law 31/2004 placed the Military Courts under the
Supreme Court. Nevertheless, pending further legal reforms the
Supreme Court does not have formal supervision over the Military
Courts. For now, the military remains in control of their
composition, organisation, procedure and financial
administration.
There is a vibrant ongoing debate in Indonesia regarding the
implications of the above reforms, and whether—or when—
further amendments to those laws governing the armed forces
will occur. This could include a transfer of jurisdiction over some
types of crimes committed by military personnel to the Courts of
General Jurisdiction.
For example, a revised KUHPM might include a distinction
between “service related” and “non-service related” offences, with
jurisdiction for the latter category of offences under the civilian
courts. This distinction is made in criminal justice systems in
many countries, and has often been identified as a step that
should be taken in order to promote accountability within the
armed forces. With such a change it would be important to
indicate clearly that serious violations of human rights, including
torture, rape, hostage taking, enforced disappearance and the
deliberate killing of persons not taking part in hostilities cannot
be considered “service-related acts”, and must always be tried in
either Courts of General Jurisdiction or the Human Rights
Courts, depending on the alleged crime. This is the position
increasingly adopted in international human rights bodies and
in national best practice.
Pending reforms to the KUHPM, it is important that there
nevertheless exist mechanisms within the military justice
system to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of
any persons believed to be responsible for crimes, irrespective of
rank or status. This clearly requires ensuring that military
police, prosecutors and judges are placed outside of the ordinary
military command hierarchy.
Obstacles to human rights cases in Indonesia
Perhaps the most significant single obstacle to the effective
implementation of human rights laws in Indonesia to date is
fear of the military. Military intimidation of victims and
witnesses, members of the Komnas HAM inquiry teams,
prosecutors and judges, real or perceived, direct or indirect, eats
away at the effectiveness of the process and prevents all parties
from carrying out their roles effectively. However, to date the
prosecution of most human rights violations alleged to have been
committed by military personnel remains almost exclusively
within the remit of the military justice system rather than the
civilian courts.
Intimidation is often coupled with other forms of interference
in the judicial process. Victims are frequently bought off. The
notion of punishment as a deterrent is not widely appreciated.
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Witnesses are unprotected, and it is hardly surprising that they
choose out of court settlement over the uncertainties of a judicial
system that has obtained little respect among the population.
There is still no law on witness protection, and no way to provide
it.
The reports on the East Timor trials contain many criticisms
of the work of the prosecution, documenting a lack of seriousness
in prosecuting the accused that can only be described as
deliberate bad faith.4 The criticisms can be categorized in several
groups.
Firstly, there are criticisms of the prosecution concerning
improper influence, corruption and politics. In this respect,
human rights cases cannot be seen in isolation from the general
condition of the Attorney General’s Office. Many reports have
underlined the enormity of the task of reforming this centralized
bureaucracy, with a rigid command structure, insufficient
guarantees of independence from government and, according to
many, institutionalized systems of unofficial payments. It has
also been no secret among prosecutors that there is little career
incentive to work on trials involving senior military officers.
A second set of problems involves a lack of knowledge and
resources among prosecutors. There have been some efforts to
resolve these, with the creation of a special unit within the
prosecution to pursue human rights cases. This unit has sought
external assistance, through which it has received some limited
training.
A third set of difficulties is organisational. Komnas HAM
officials have pointed out that there is too much rotation of staff
within the prosecution, so that those with skills are moved on.
Even within the same case, there is a lack of continuity of
prosecutors at investigation and trial. As the prosecutor at trial
is not permitted to introduce evidence other than that described
in the bill of indictment, poor work done at the indictment stage
can fatally hamper the work done later in court. New evidence
can only be introduced if asked for by the judges. The lack of a
pre-trial procedure to iron out problems like this is a weakness
of KUHAP.
Yet a fourth set of obstacles concerns the inability of
prosecutors to obtain evidence, either documentary or
testimonial, from the military. Unlike, for example, the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, Law 26/2000 contains no
provisions relating to the confidentiality of matters affecting
national security. Neither do the rules laid down by KUHAP. The
result is that in theory, the armed forces are obliged to reveal all
information required of them by the civilian investigators, even
matters that might jeopardize the security of members of the
armed forces in combat situations. In practice, the armed forces
simply signal an unwillingness to comply. The prosecutors appear
not to insist, and the evidence is not forthcoming. The authors
are unaware of any principled legal contest on this issue between
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the prosecution and the armed forces that has gone to court.
The Attorney General’s office has instead attempted to negotiate
a Memorandum of Agreement with the military. Thus, instead
of having a set of rules with reasonable safeguards for legitimate
cause, there are unrealistically broad rules that are
unenforceable in practice. Subordinating the military to the rule
of law and civilian institutions is still in its early days in
Indonesia, particularly in the judicial domain.
It is also certain that Indonesian investigators and judges will
continue to come under close domestic and international
scrutiny, and questions regarding their independence will
continue to be posed. Pressure to acquit will, for political and
institutional reasons, remain high for the foreseeable future. A
culture of judicial and prosecutorial independence and
professionalism will take time to firmly establish, and it is by no
means guaranteed that current reform initiatives will not be
reversed in the future. A significant group of judges, particularly
in the higher courts, opposes reform and deeply resents the
international pressure which led to the establishment of the
Human Rights Courts and introduction into Indonesian legal
practice of international human rights law and jurisprudence.
Through Law 26/2000 and the related Law 39/1999, concerning
human rights, Indonesian law has begun to engage with the
international human rights standards.
The reform process has likewise promised transparency, giving
rise to an expectation that judgments can be readily accessed
and a proper explanation will be given for the decision reached
in each case. A problem that exists across the whole judiciary is
the frequent inaccessibility of judgments, not only for interested
members of the public, but even for the parties to the proceedings
and their legal representatives. Many observers have
commented on the desirability for the whole judiciary to practice
increased openness and to facilitate the access of interested
parties, their legal representatives and the general public to
decisions of the courts, and the Supreme Court has identified
this as a reform priority.
Conclusion
Since the adoption of Law 26/2000, there has been
overwhelming domestic and international expectation on the
Indonesian Human Rights Courts, and on the agencies
responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes that fall
within their jurisdiction, to bring the perpetrators of serious
violations of human rights to account for their actions. In large
part, these expectations have been disappointed. There are many
reasons for this, legislative, political, and procedural.
Nevertheless, even within the existing legal and judicial
framework there exist underutilised possibilities to ensure
accountability for these crimes. The Indonesian Penal Code
contains numerous provisions that could be used to prosecute
human rights violators, which in many cases would be more
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suited to the crimes alleged than the restricted list of crimes
that fall within the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts but
in practice are not being used to any significant degree at present.
The result of this, when coupled with the jurisdictional
limitations of Law 26/2000, is that violators of human rights
continue to enjoy impunity, bar a few exceptions.
At the same time, all criminal justice institutions in Indonesia
need to continue with measures to root out the corruption and
nepotism that was a characteristic of the New Order period, and
to replace these values with a working culture that promotes
probity, professional independence, a love of justice and a desire
to uphold the rule of law. Instilling such values will require a
commitment by the government of Indonesia to improve material
conditions of service for justice officials, and by the government
and cooperation partners alike to increase the legal knowledge
and capacity of these officials to implement the law faithfully.
Further legal and procedural reform is needed to close some of
the gaps in human rights protection and enforcement
mechanisms that currently exist. Of the many issues raised in
this article, three are of particular concern.
First, the Human Rights Courts—or any other court that may
in the future be given jurisdiction to try cases of crimes against
humanity and genocide—must also be able to consider
indictments in the alternative, so as to avoid a situation where
a defendant can walk free, despite strong evidence to support a
conviction for a crime of, for example, extrajudicial killing or
torture because the evidence is not sufficient to meet all of the
elements of one of the previously named crimes. Further, in this
regard, courts trying cases of alleged human rights violations by
military personnel must be invested with jurisdiction over war
crimes.
Secondly, there must be a review of existing jurisdictional
demarcation between the different courts as regards competence
to try military officials accused of human rights violations, and
at the same time to ensure that the principle of superior
responsibility in Indonesian law is in accordance with
international law, so that both de jure and de facto leaders can be
held to account.
Thirdly, cases involving the alleged commission of human
rights violations under the KUHP by members of the police force
must be carried out by an independent agency, and the police
officers in question suspended from their posts pending the
outcome of the enquiry. The outcome of such investigations
should always be made public. The first of these measures is
required to ensure full compliance with Indonesia’s obligations
under the UN Convention against Torture, which it has ratified.
Under the revised constitution, Indonesia is now a state ruled
by law, where all holders of public office, from the president down,
are obliged to respect the constitution and apply the laws of the
land faithfully. Measures undertaken by the judiciary, together
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with prosecution and investigation agencies, to hold violators of
human rights accountable are not only in the interests of the
vast majority of the people of Indonesia; they also protect and
strengthen the legitimacy of the state and its institutions.
Endnotes
1 MPR Decree VII/MPR/2000, clause 3.4.a and 7.4 provides that the
police should be subject to the civilian courts. The decree was
implemented by Law Number 2 of 2002 on the National Police of the
Republic of Indonesia (POLRI).
2 A complete discussion of the divergences between Law 26/2000
and the Rome Statute can be found in the Amnesty International
document, ‘Amnesty International’s comments on the Law on
Human Rights Courts (Law No. 26/2000)’, AI Index: ASA 21/005/
2001, available online at: www.amnesty.org.
3 See the Celibici case: Prosecutor v Delalic et. al., IT-96-21-T,
Judgment 16 November 1998 (Trial Chamber); Prosecution v Delalic
et. al., IT-96-21-A, Judgment 21 February 2001 (Appeals Chamber).
4 See ‘Intended to Fail: the Trials before the Ad Hoc Human Rights
Court in Jakarta’, Professor David Cohen, International Centre for
Transitional Justice, available online at: www.ictj.org. See also, ‘The
failure of Leipzig repeated in Jakarta: Final Assessment on the
Human Rights Ad-Hoc Tribunal for East Timor’, Elsam, Jakarta, 9
September 2003, available online at: www.elsam.or.id.
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